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 Introduction 
 Procurement is then an integral part of health policy. However, it 
is of course also a part of industrial policy. This is because the way 
in which purchasing decisions are structured and regulated impact 
profoundly on the way in which production happens. Thus, consid-
eration of the pros and cons associated with procurement regimes 
needs to be in terms, not only of whether immediate health policy 
priorities are achieved, but also in light of longer term sustainability 
of supply of innovative health products. Thus, price, value and inno-
vation are closely interwoven. (Srinivas, 2012: 126) 
 Part II of this book has demonstrated that building synergies between 
health systems and industrial development is a complex process of 
reshaping the politics and political economy of the two systems. A 
key tool for building and sustaining health-industry relationships, as 
Smita Srinivas observes above and as some Part I chapters also empha-
sized, is procurement. Yet procurement remains under-researched and 
over-simplified as a technical, linear, ordering and delivery process (see 
Chapter 8), rather than an exercise in deepening and strengthening 
the domestic economy through market and non-market relationships 
building. 
 This chapter aims to shift the literature on health sector procure-
ment into a more developmental mould. It is an innovative procure-
ment chapter in the conceptual sense, addressing the question of how 
health sector procurement can be developmental both by addressing 
health sector needs and values and by sustaining industrial suppliers. It 
also puts forward innovative arguments, exploring in some detail how 
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procurement can constitute a business asset, and using the example of 
value-based pricing (VBP) in medicines procurement to explore how 
procurement can better address health sector needs in marketized and 
fragmented lower-income health systems. 
 The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section focuses on 
procurement as an industrial policy in African pharmaceutical markets. 
It takes a detailed microeconomic look at procurement design from the 
perspective of local pharmaceutical firms, for whom access to working 
capital is a major developmental constraint. Using illustrative data from 
Zimbabwe, the chapter shows that procurement can be either a source 
of finance or a serious drain on the finances of firms that operate in the 
context of high bank charges and interest rates, and in highly competi-
tive markets. Careful procurement redesign can have a substantial 
impact on firms’ cash flow and investment prospects. 
 The second section turns to innovative procurement strategies that 
stitch industrial production and innovation into the values and needs 
of health sector users in African countries. It explains and examines the 
emergent practice of value-based pricing (VBP) as a tool to link medicines 
prices to health needs. So far applied mainly in high-income countries, 
VBP nevertheless falls within a category of global and local procurement 
initiatives that try to foreground need in the design of public procure-
ment. The discussion recognizes that public procurement, because of 
its scale and the values it embodies, is not simply a process of market 
purchase. Medicines markets and other related institutions are co-created 
by public and private sectors in complex and diverse ways. Integral to 
this pattern of interaction and articulation is the way in which medi-
cines are purchased and the way in which prices are determined. These 
decisions are political as well as economic, as reflected in the Srinivas 
quote above. 
 Public procurement as an industrial policy tool 
 In the economic development literature, and in the debates on public 
policies such as defence procurement, there is a long-standing recog-
nition that public procurement can operate as industrial policy. ‘Buy 
local’ campaigns and local preferences often formed part of import 
substitution policies of the type discussed in Part I. The liberalization 
policies of the 1980s, in both lower-income and higher-income coun-
tries, generally removed local procurement preferences and employed 
international competitive tendering to open up domestic markets to 
external competition. The development economist Sanjaya Lall, whose 
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conceptual framework of industrial capabilities is used throughout this 
book, was a persistent proponent of the continuing need for indus-
trial development policy in these ‘globalized’ and fast-moving market 
contexts. In the early 2000s he posed the question: ‘What can poor 
countries do to strengthen their industrial competitiveness in the 
international economic setting?’ (Lall 2003). His argument that in 
developing countries, industrial capabilities (technological, financial, 
organizational and dynamic) develop slowly, and are cumulative and 
‘path dependent’ as industries and institutions build on existing skills 
(Chapter 2), implied the need for local policy interventions such as 
local content rules for firms’ procurement. Lall (2003) identified firms’ 
procurement capabilities, as well as those of governments, as elements 
of cumulative industrial improvement, and recognized the importance 
of developing larger groups of firms in one sector so that they generate 
‘spill-over’ benefits (Chapter 2). 
 Much writing on procurement focuses on its role in providing a 
market for locally supplied goods and services, and hence sustaining 
business development (Ogot et al., 2009; Uyarra and Flanagan, 2009; see 
also Chapter 3). The market impact of public procurement is very large. 
Among OECD (high-income) countries in 2011, 13% of GDP on average 
was spent by government on procurement of goods and services (OECD 
nd). In some African countries, outsourcing has rapidly increased the 
size of public procurement. In Kenya for example, public procurement 
as a percentage of GDP rose from about 6% in 2002 to 27% in 2008 
(Ogot et al., 2009). 
 Lall’s framework indicates, however, that public procurement as a 
developmental tool should go beyond providing a market, to support 
local industrial innovation. Public health procurement can act as a 
financing and incentive mechanism to improve technological capabili-
ties, a key element of pharmaceutical industry development as discussed 
throughout this book. Increasingly, public procurement is promoted 
as an industrial and innovation policy tool (Kattel and Lember, 2010; 
Uyarra and Flanagan, 2009). Public procurement creates and enhances 
markets for new and existing technologies by shaping the demand 
environment. It can promote sustainable consumption and production 
patterns: for example, the US government in 1993 issued an Executive 
Order for all federal agencies to procure energy-efficient computers, 
resulting in market transformation for Energy Star computer equipment 
(Kjöllerström, 2008). Procurement can target purchase of goods and 
services that are new to the country, or new to the world. This chapter 
explores innovative ways to strengthen the role of procurement in 
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relation to pharmaceutical industry development and the needs of the 
health sector in Sub-Saharan African countries. 
 Trade credit and working capital: the view from the firms 
 To understand how the financial aspects of procurement design 
can influence industrial development, it helps to start by analysing 
how pharmaceutical firms in Africa can use trade credit to reduce 
borrowing and keep down manufacturing costs. Firms can use their 
input suppliers as an in-kind financing mechanism, via trade credit, 
in order to reduce their call on their own funds or expensive bank 
finance. Firms’ private sector procurement mechanisms therefore play 
a critical role in managing working capital financing requirements 
and cash flows. 
 By negotiating for generous trade credit terms, firms can fund varying 
proportions of raw material procurement, production and logistics proc-
esses, and sometimes influence the debtors’ collection period. Astute 
use of these options turns the firms’ own procurement process into 
a generator of in-kind finance. Failure to use them causes the firm to 
haemorrhage cash if it pays suppliers in advance or opts not to stretch 
its suppliers by paying their invoices early, before reaching the limit of 
their credit terms. 
 We describe here how trade credit can aid small to medium enterprises 
in accessing in-kind finance through contractual relationships with 
larger and more established firms and organizations with better access 
to finance. Suppliers endowed with market power and reputation can 
access formal credit (usually cheaply) from banks and then extend trade 
credit (an in-kind loan) to buyers with less access to bank or own finance 
(Nilsen, 2002; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Because suppliers choose to 
whom to advance trade credit, trade credit serves as a screening and 
monitoring device for suppliers (Berlin, 2003). The fact that there are 
more suppliers, who are better at evaluating credit risk, than there 
are financial intermediaries makes trade credit an important source of 
finance in an economy. When suppliers extend credit to buyers, they 
reduce transactional costs, making business transactions cheaper and 
easier (Gianetti et al., 2011). 
 Trade credit is therefore a cheap source of short-term, external, in-kind 
finance, advanced not as money but goods on credit. If firms under-
stand how to handle finance (if they have good finance capabilities, see 
Chapter 15), they can use trade credit to reduce cautionary cash hold-
ings thereby alleviating cash flow problems. 
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 Thus for firms in poorly developed markets, trade credit assumes great 
importance: there is evidence that industries have an elevated depend-
ence on trade credit in countries with poorly developed financial markets 
(Fisman and Love, 2003). For Zimbabwe, Fafchamps (1997), using 
evidence from the 1993 Regional Program for Enterprise Development 
(RPED) panel survey of 200 Zimbabwean companies, found that trade 
credit indeed played a significant role in financing enterprises. Trade 
credit as a percentage of outstanding balances constituted 27% for micro 
enterprises, 26% for small enterprises, 30% for medium enterprises and 
30% for large enterprises. 
 However the economic deterioration of the 2000s decade in Zimbabwe 
caused a high level of uncertainty, shortage of foreign currency and 
increased country risk. Consequently, local firms found it difficult to 
access trade credit from suppliers for APIs and excipients. The dearth of 
trade credit and reliance on expensive bank finance throttled financial 
breathing space for the companies. 
 In those circumstances, firms can find themselves in a perverse situa-
tion, whereby local pharmaceutical firms are funding suppliers instead 
of vice versa. Local companies had low bargaining power because they 
purchased small quantities of raw materials, and their suppliers were not 
worried if they lost them as customers. Local firms procured raw mate-
rials from merchants and brokers with critical mass to move 15 to 30 
tonnes of products, and the brokers then sold smaller quantities at higher 
margins to local firms. APIs and excipients were paid for in advance 
because suppliers feared country political risk and foreign currency risk, 
a legacy from the times when Zimbabwe had serious foreign currency 
shortages despite the country’s subsequent shift to using a basket of 
foreign currencies. Zimbabwean firms, because they paid in advance, 
were therefore financing economically stronger suppliers in India and 
China. 
 Where international suppliers sold to local firms, they also reduced 
their perceived risk by demanding a letter of credit (LC). The LC costs 
2.5% of value, plus charges for establishing the LC and transaction 
charges. Local firms sought to reduce these high financing costs by nego-
tiating for in-country bonded warehouses to hold goods for purchase, 
reducing delays due to shipping and customs clearance and hence the 
period when the firm would be out of pocket while awaiting the raw 
materials. Broadly, the trade financing pattern became another example 
of a perverse subsidy from weaker African economies to stronger trade 
partners, which one can find reflected also in other markets. 
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 Public procurement terms as a financial asset for businesses 
 The discussion above demonstrates just how strongly a pattern of 
trade financing can influence the cash flow and business development 
of local firms. It follows that the design of the payment and credit 
systems used in public sector procurement can strongly affect the busi-
nesses from which the government purchases goods and services. The 
payment mechanisms in public procurement constitute implicit busi-
ness financing mechanisms – or a drain on the business. 
 Public drug procurement payments can be made in at least in three 
ways; advance payment, cash on delivery or credit terms. Each of these 
payment modes affects the manufacturers’ cash flows, cost of finance 
and eventually the cost of manufacturing pharmaceuticals. The payment 
terms can be a source of finance for the firm to use in the production 
process, or they can cause the producer to seek external expensive 
finance whilst awaiting payment for goods produced and delivered for 
periods ranging up to six months. 
 Advance payment provides direct business funding, as payment is made 
in advance of goods and services delivery. Advance payment reduces the 
need for manufacturing firms to borrow expensive bank finance when it 
does not have sufficient cash holdings. With advance payment, the firm 
uses these funds to purchase raw material, fund the production process 
and pay labour. While advance payment, in accounting terms, becomes 
a short-term liability on the balance sheet of the firm, nevertheless the 
funds obtained for the pharmaceutical products to be supplied constitute 
an asset (cash holding) that the firm uses for production and logistics. 
 With the cash-on-delivery payment method, the buyer pays on receipt 
of goods and services. The manufacturing firm therefore funds raw mate-
rial acquisition, production and logistics with either own or borrowed 
(expensive) funds. Compared to the advance payment method, cash 
on delivery therefore imposes varying degrees of financing costs on the 
firm. If the firm uses its own funds, the financing costs are lower than 
bank borrowing, though accountants will argue that using internally 
generated funds has important opportunity costs for the business. 
 The third payment method involves credit terms. The manufacturing 
firm delivers goods to the procurement agency, which pays after a 
certain pre-agreed period of time from the date they receive the invoice. 
The period can generally range from 30 to 90 days and in some instances 
as much as 180 days. This is the most strenuous payment method of 
the three described for the manufacturing firm’s cash flows. The firm 
must fund raw materials acquisition, production and logistics processes 
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through the period up to payment. The firm must also have skills in 
chasing on-time payment by the buyer. This chasing process is espe-
cially difficult in many instances when the government or state agencies 
are the buyer, and they need to wait for disbursement of funds from 
central treasury (see, e.g. Chapter 3). Onerous credit terms of this kind 
have constrained many African pharmaceutical manufacturing firms to 
resort to very expensive bank financing prior to receiving payment. 
 In effect, many local pharmaceutical firms have no option but to 
provide the government with credit terms: they are effectively helping 
to finance the local health system. This generates recurrent cash flow 
problems as they try to fund successive operating cycles. The process of 
waiting for payment, especially on an order which is large relative to the 
firm’s capacity, can undermine the firm’s ability to procure raw materials 
and pay labour and associated production costs for the next production 
cycle, as well as constraining effective sales and distribution. 
 In these constrained situations, there are ways in which a confirmed 
order or an invoice can be used by a firm to fund production cycles. Two 
possibilities are a supply chain structured-credit finance approach, and 
invoice discounting or factoring. 
 In the first, supply chain structured-credit approach, the firm can use 
the strength of the procurement agency’s own high credit standing. Once 
the firm has a confirmed order, it can go to a bank to approve a credit 
facility with conditions. One of the conditions could be the firm assigns 
the amount payable after fulfilment of the order to the bank. By assigning 
the firm’s (creditworthy) debtors to the bank, it gives the bank control 
over the funds to be paid. Because funds are disbursed before products 
have been produced, the firm needs to procure raw material and produce 
and deliver products before the buyer pays. Consequently, this type of 
financing carries production, performance and payment risk, hence the 
need for the firm to have an acceptable production reputation and for the 
buyer to have good payment reputation. What is key is that the firm can 
access funds based on a confirmed order from a reputable buyer: an effi-
cient public procurement body that pays reliably can fulfil this role. 
 The second approach of invoice discounting and factoring requires 
a much broader and deeper financial institution architecture in the 
country, including banks and factoring and discounting institutions. 
This financing method involves a financial institution paying a propor-
tion (up to 85%) of invoice value to a firm in advance, against invoices 
billed to the firm’s buyers. Factoring and invoice discounting are prepay-
ment methods against a sales ledger for a firm – in other words, it offers 
advance or early payment to the firm that sold its goods. Instead of the 
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firm waiting for payment by the buyer after, say, 180 days, the firm is 
able to access working capital finance to fund its production cycles. In 
this instance, instead of getting advance payment from the customer, 
the firm gets the advance payment (a proportion) from the financial 
institution. 
 Essentially invoice discounting and factoring work in the same way, 
the difference residing in who has credit control over collection of the 
debt (amount payable to the supplier). With discounting, the firm has 
control on debt collection, while in factoring, the firm hands over the 
collection of the debt to the financial institution, writing formally to its 
customers to pay the bank directly; the bank then carries the responsi-
bility of collecting the debt. 
 It follows that if the public procurement agency for the health sector 
has a good track record for paying on time, it opens up an avenue for 
firms to access funds based on invoices. This financing approach is 
attractive because production risk is no longer an issue as the products 
have already been manufactured. The greatest risk is payment risk by the 
procurement agency, since many agencies procuring medicines using 
African government funds may find it hard to pay consistently on time, 
since their own funding may be erratic (see Chapter 8). 
 Procurement as an asset: a Zimbabwean example 
 Where there is political will and substantial financing, public – including 
donor-backed –procurement can become a substantial asset for local 
manufacturing firms and the health systems they supply. An example is 
the support generated for manufacturing anti-retroviral (ARV) drugs in 
Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwean government initially created and assured 
the market for locally produced ARVs by providing a funding mecha-
nism, in a context where there were strong local manufacturing capabil-
ities. As a result, Zimbabwe became one of the first African countries to 
manufacture ARVs locally, in 2003. We explore how this came to pass. 
 During the economic challenges of the late 1980s and 1990s, Zimbabwe 
faced a huge social and health challenge emanating from the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic. HIV/AIDS was placing a huge strain on an overburdened and 
underfunded health system. In response, the government converted 
an existing drought levy into the AIDS levy to finance the HIV/AIDS 
programme. The government set up the National Aids Council and the 
National Aids Trust to collect and administers the AIDS levy, set at 3% 
of salaries for formally employed people. Fifty per cent of the AIDS levy 
is reserved for medicines procurement, with the balance allocated to 
prevention, awareness and administration costs. 
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 The government issued a compulsory license to manufacture ARVs 
and promised to purchase 75% of the locally manufactured medicines 
(Osewe et al., 2008). It is important to recognize that the government 
could only issue a compulsory license because Zimbabwe had built the 
infrastructure and capabilities to locally manufacture pharmaceutical 
drugs from the 1950s (Chapter 1). Transferring the technology in order 
to manufacture ARVs locally was thus possible because of this industrial 
background. 
 However, in spite of government’s intentions, the hyperinflationary 
environment of the 2000s constrained public health financing capacity, 
culminating in the collapse of the public health system (2003 to 2009). 
The result was a shift to high donor dependence for financing the 
public health system and medicines procurement. This shift incapaci-
tated public procurement as an industrial policy tool (NECF, 2010), and 
was the greatest cause of decline in local industry capacity utilization. 
Reliance on donor funding that fragments public procurement policies 
continues to pose a demand-side constraint for local pharmaceutical 
manufacturing. 
 However, there are exceptions: one donor-funded programme in 
Zimbabwe provides an unusual example of support from donors for local 
pharmaceutical production. Ordinarily, in many African health settings, 
donor-funded health programmes tend to import medicines from 
India or China independently of public procurement mechanisms. For 
example, in Zimbabwe the principal purchaser of anti-retroviral drugs 
for The Global Fund is the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), which procures the drugs through their pooled procurement 
base in Copenhagen. 1 This removes public procurement as an indus-
trial policy tool from the available policy arsenal for stimulating and 
supporting innovation and industrial development in the African 
context. In such situations, the market becomes unreachable for local 
manufacturers. 
 However in this case, purposive support for local manufacturing was 
provided. The Extended Support Programme funded by the European 
Union and DFID (the UK Department For International Development) 
supported local manufacturers CAPS Pharmaceuticals and Varichem in 
Zimbabwe to manufacture and supply medicines to the local health 
system during the era of economic collapse (Table 13.1). This example 
shows that donor-funded programmes can support local industry and 
operate as an effective industrial policy tool. Table 13.1 shows that 
CAPS and Varichem were contracted to supply more than US$4 million 
worth of drugs to the programme. The contract value shows the values 
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of medicines that were supposed to be delivered, and value delivered 
shows what the companies had actually delivered by the time the report 
was compiled (EU, 2010). Table 13.1 also shows that locally based phar-
maceutical wholesalers, including PCD, GHC, Mission Pharma and SJV, 
were allocated quotas that they filled through imports. 
 A key issue raised by this example is the political scope for governments 
to incentivize or compel large donors to purchase locally manufactured 
pharmaceutical products. Such a move can increase governments’ space 
for policy manoeuvre. The South African government, for example, 
insists on local suppliers in many circumstances: when foreign compa-
nies win tenders, they must go into an agency arrangement with a local 
South African firm, as exemplified by a case where a Zimbabwean firm 
won a tender to supply ARVs to the South African public health system 
and had to partner with a South African firm. Other African govern-
ments have been less energetic or effective in imposing local partner 
requirements on overseas suppliers. 
 Public industrial procurement to serve health needs and values 
 The previous section has centred on the scope for aligning demand for 
health commodities with industrial development needs. This section 
 Table 13.1  Donor support for local industry through contracting for local health 
supplies: Zimbabwe 
 Contracts for drug supply by some pharmaceutical manufacturing firms 
and importers 
 Supplier 
 Contract Value 
(Euro) 
 Value Delivered 
(Euro) 
 % Completion 
of Supply 
Varichem Lot 2 1,788,800 1,522,404 85.11
Varichem Lot 4 198,500 198,500 100
CAPS Lot 1 2,289,784 961,139 41.98
PCD Lot 2 433,967 433,967 100
PCD Lot 3 570,235 570,235 100
PCD Lot 4 198,500 198,500 100
GHC 1,585,464 1,585,379 99.99
Mission Pharma Lot 1 986,615 981,044 99.44
Mission Pharma Lot 2 63,000 63,000 100
SJV 253,280 253,280 100
 Total  8,368,145  6,767,488  80.87 
 Source : EU, 2010. 
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reverses the view, to ask: To what extent can medicines procurement be 
shaped to ensure that local industrial development increasingly serves 
the health needs of the populations dependent on the local health 
system? This is a question raised and addressed for the Brazilian health-
industrial complex and its policy development in Chapter 9. Here, we 
examine schemes that link reimbursement and assessment of a product’s 
value to the impact that products have in real-world contexts. These 
efforts can be seen as reflecting a desire to link the introduction of new 
products to competent health care, which allow for maximum access 
and benefit. The objective is to bring local industrial production and 
innovation closer to the health needs it should serve 
 Our focus is on a particular innovative procurement mechanism: 
value-based pricing of medicines. While this is to date a mechanism 
largely experimented with in high-income countries, we think it is 
important because it shifts the attention of procurement policy from 
a market (often monopoly) price for an already developed drug to 
an assessment of how a drug will actually work in particular country 
contexts and for identified needs. Its attractiveness is in indicating 
ways forward in adapting procurement to a focus on population health 
benefit and patient needs. 
 The broader lessons are particularly pertinent for developing country 
contexts, where fragmented and marketized health systems may generate 
wide gaps between population needs and market demand. Public and 
donor procurement mechanism then need to specify as well as address 
population health needs. An early and widespread example of such an 
innovative procurement mechanism was the essential medicines lists, 
developed by the WHO and by health activists, that specify priorities for 
procurement of essential medicines, by generic names, to support access 
to drugs that are deemed essential for particular populations (Laing 
et al., 2003). The parallel to the discussion of VBP here is that the essen-
tial medicines lists also aimed to shift the design of public procurement 
towards better serving needs. 
 Public procurement and industrial innovation for unmet need 
 The use of VBP has focussed to date on the role it can play in relation 
to innovator drugs targeted for currently unmet or poorly met health 
needs. The dominant framework of thought on incentives for industrial 
innovation identifies an imbalance between investment risk in innova-
tion and reward for the innovation. This ‘market failure’ is then put 
forward as the rationale for public sector investment in basic science: 
there is insufficient incentive for the private sector to invest in basic and 
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long-term research, so the public sector should underpin drug discovery 
with support for early-stage research. 
 However, this conceptual apparatus does little to explain the actual 
way in which the public and private sectors invest in drug discovery, 
development and procurement. At all stages, public and private sectors 
inform each other in influencing the rate and direction of innovation. 
As argued in the introduction, markets and other institutions are co-cre-
ated by public and private sectors. The discussion of VBP locates it as one 
example of this changing pattern of political and economic interaction 
and articulation, in this case in the way in which drugs are purchased 
and prices are determined. 
 One observation from recent patterns of public and private interac-
tion is that market and institutional failures clearly occur not only at the 
research stage but also at the other end of value chain – at the market 
access end. This is especially the case in developing country contexts, 
and a growing international focus on policy, charitable and public sector 
initiatives has emerged over the past two decades using procurement 
to address the problems. The institutional vehicles include The Global 
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), set up in 2000, which 
brings together public and private actors to address the challenge of 
equal access for new and underused vaccines programmes in the world’s 
poorest countries. As of 2013, GAVI stakeholders have committed US$8.2 
billion to achieving their mission and have supported the immuniza-
tion of an estimated 440 million children (GAVI, 2013). 
 The Global Fund and access initiatives that are disease specific include 
other examples of efforts to raise the financial endowment needed 
to generate innovation, product uptake and access to markets for 
producers, as well as access to medicines for the patients. Their procure-
ment initiatives are designed to support the skills, finance and techno-
logical resource endowment required for innovation. In Europe, there 
has also been renewed policy thinking about how to construct public 
and private interaction so that appropriate products get to patients 
(Chataway et al., 2012). Initiatives such as the European Commission’s 
Innovative Medicines Initiatives support basic and applied research 
(Morgan Jones et al., 2013). 
 Other high-income country initiatives such as the Innovate UK stem 
cell programme support policy thinking and address regulatory, business 
development, funding and access to market issues. At the same time, new 
approaches to health technology assessment constitute what has been 
colloquially termed ‘the fourth hurdle’. Going beyond efficacy, effec-
tiveness and product approval, they cover value assessments and relate 
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to pricing and procurement. Procurement and the technology assess-
ment that goes along with it should be seen as a form of regulation. 
 Previous work has suggested that well-targeted systems of regu-
lation and standard setting result in better outcomes than broad-
brush approaches in terms of overall outcomes, including innovation 
(Chataway et al., 2006). For instance, broad regulatory judgment across 
Europe that banned all products that left chemical residue in water 
had the unintended consequence of encouraging use of products that 
were environmentally damaging in a number of other respects than the 
products that had been banned. The message this regulation sent out to 
innovators who had worked on creating more environmentally friendly 
products was negative. It may well be the case similarly that regulation 
that bans all use of medicines that have undesirable consequences for 
a very limited number of patients can result in treatments that are less 
beneficial for the majority. New regulatory science as conceived of by the 
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the European Medicines 
Agency (EMA) hopes to target regulation ever more carefully to those 
who are at risk. 
 Value-based pricing 
 This hope that targeted policy and intervention will deliver better results 
also underpins value-based pricing. The central idea of VBP is that the 
price of a drug may differ according to the impact that it has on different 
groups of patients, and maybe also across different health system 
contexts (Claxton et al., 2008). The desire to become more targeted and 
specific is common to both traditional rule-based regulation and inno-
vative procurement-based regulation. 
 Lying behind VBP is a concept of health benefits and costs. Pricing of 
new innovator drugs is a question not of how much they cost, but of 
how much the firm can take out of a health system through the price 
it manages to charge. Where there is a highly competitive market for a 
medicine, competitive tendering can drive down prices. Where there 
is a monopoly supplier, the price is a matter for negotiation if procure-
ment agencies have the competence and methodologies. A recent MSF 
report reported from contacts with nine pharmaceutical companies that 
value-based and differential pricing strategies were used predominantly 
in non-competitive markets for vaccines (e.g. for new products) where 
manufacturers do not have to compete on price (MSF, 2015). 
 Since resources in all health systems are limited, health economists 
use tools for technology assessment to feed into assessments of whether 
a certain therapy should be reimbursed. The concept of the incremental 
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cost effectiveness ratio (ICER) has become one driver of reimburse-
ment for new drugs. Along with measures of Quality Adjusted Life Years 
(QALYs), ICER calculations are used to measure health benefit and cost 
to health care provider, and these metrics are used to compare the attrac-
tiveness of different therapies. VBP provides a different approach to the 
logic of reimbursement. The UK is one of the countries that has been 
debating the introduction of a new way of determining the price for 
new drugs. The new UK regime has been partly driven by fiscal austerity 
in the country, in which funds for the purchase of new drugs may well 
depend on savings in other aspects of health spending. VBP seems to 
offer a broader approach to pricing decisions, which looks at the impact 
of drugs on overall health and social care systems. 
 The UK Department of Health has traditionally used a pharmaceu-
tical price regulation scheme to control expenditure on branded drugs. 2 
Recently, however, it has been considering a move to a more outcomes- 
or value-based approach (Persson et al., 2010). Like the calculations of 
quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) gained from using the new drug, VBP 
would also assess the benefits of a drug to individuals. The difference is 
that VBP signals a move to determining the price to be paid for the drug 
on the basis of assessment of a drug’s impact in terms of health benefits 
 and its contributions to the overall health system. The value-based price 
is in theory the price that ensures that health benefits for patients and 
the wider society exceed the health benefits displaced elsewhere in the 
health system and in the society due to the medicines’ additional costs 
(Camps-Walsh et al., 2009; Claxton et al., 2008). The move is also to a 
more targeted and perhaps more adaptive system, with ongoing assess-
ments of a drug’s value potentially influencing its price. Again in theory, 
the calculation would take into account the importance of incentives 
for innovation. 
 The move has a number of implications, and Verhoef and Morris 
(2015) provide a summary of what value criteria other than QALYs (or 
similar measure of patient-level health gains) have been advanced in the 
literature as possible components of VBP. These include:
 Wider patient- or disease-related value criteria such as severity of  ●
disease (e.g. whether it is an acute, chronic, rare or terminal disease); 
unmet need; size of relevant population; age groups particularly 
suffering an impact of the disease (e.g. children); socially disadvan-
taged patients; number of other treatment options. 
 Health care-related value criteria: being treated at a convenient time  ●
and location and after only a short wait; being treated in a way that 
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patients consider less unpleasant (e.g. taking a medicine once a 
week as opposed to three times a day); and the degree of risk of the 
treatment. 
 Wider societal value criteria such as ability of patients (and carers)  ●
to resume work or to work more productively; cost savings to other 
publicly funded services (e.g. social care), patients or carers; and how 
innovative the medicine is. 
 Some versions of VBP schemes might also involve differential pricing 
for different patient cohorts. For example, a group of patients with one 
genetic makeup may benefit more than another group, and therefore 
the price paid for the drug being taken by the group that benefits more 
would be higher. 
 Value attributes will need to be collected, measured, aggregated and 
converted to evaluate a ‘value metric’ (Deloitte, 2012). 3 The data that 
will feed into this assessment will need to go beyond purely clinical trial 
data. Real-world data – that is, data relevant to the drug in use, not just 
in trials – would apply both before the market launch (e.g. up-to-date 
cost of illness data) and post-launch: comparative real-world data, infor-
mation on side effects and changes in effectiveness over time (Greiner, 
2011). The sources of such data could transcend patients, clinicians, 
hospitals and social networks. The quality of the data and its format, 
governance and ethical considerations are likely to influence the feasi-
bility and extent to which VBP can reflect real-world values. There may 
well be a need for the development of new methods which can assess 
value in different contexts and under different conditions, and which 
can incorporate trade-offs. 
 A move towards VBP is certainly not without its complexities and 
dangers, and it is important to note that only a limited number of coun-
tries have attempted to implement VBP schemes. However, it is also the 
case that those countries do appear to be experiencing benefits as a result 
of the schemes they have implemented. Sweden is the most widely cited 
example of a country that has implemented a workable and successful 
scheme. Evidence from Sweden summarized in Persson (2012) suggests 
that a VBP scheme may be well placed to encourage the adoption of 
innovative medicines, especially those that address unmet needs. This 
is particularly important in the case of orphan drugs designed to treat 
rare diseases and which due to their high cost-per-QALY often fail to 
obtain reimbursement. The Swedish Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Agency (TLV), from June 2003 to April 2010, received 30 requests for 
orphan drugs reimbursements and awarded 29 (Cochrane et al., 2015). 
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 Nevertheless, there is limited evidence about how the approach can 
work in practice, and the evidence available comes from international 
examples applying only a few elements of the VBP approach. The situ-
ation is made additionally complex because VBP metrics are often used 
on conjunction with other schemes. Sweden combines VBP with other 
approaches such as coverage with evidence development (CED) schemes 
(Cochrane et al., 2015), and this in turn makes gathering evidence on 
the effectiveness of VBP approaches challenging (Persson, 2012). 
 Additionally, it is difficult to judge what impact funder silos, which 
mean that costs and benefits from health and social care, for example, 
are calculated without reference to each other, will have on the way 
that treatments are rewarded. How will methodologies be developed to 
assess the full costs and benefits in the health, social care and domestic 
settings? Can multiple budgets be brought together and analysed coher-
ently? These and other unresolved issues seem to have led to delays 
in the introduction of VBP-based schemes, although thinking about 
how VBP might be introduced on a large scale is beginning to influence 
approaches to determining price. 
 So why focus on VBP? Earlier we argued that the classic image of 
publicly supported fundamental science and private support for more 
applied work is not useful. Innovation emerges from a more diverse and 
complicated patterns of interactions between private and public sectors 
that work across the R&D and product development processes to create 
new medicines and make them accessible to patients. The public sector 
has to intervene in multiple ways to ensure that incentives offered for 
drug development are balanced with broad public interest agendas in 
ensuring access to medicines in response to need. 
 Value-based pricing is thus not about the drug; it is about the impact 
of the drug in the context of the health system and unmet health needs. 
In this respect, VBP could act as an incentive for innovation that is more 
focussed on delivery of and access to products that are designed to meet 
the most pressing needs in particular contexts. Perhaps VBP could be 
thought alongside other mechanisms to try and address local health 
needs in developing countries. For example, it could be used in conjunc-
tion with product development partnerships (PDP) or market guarantees 
focussed on particular health challenges. 
 A shift to pricing mechanisms for procurement that use local health 
needs assessment is challenging for developing countries. Nguyen et al. 
(2014) emphasize the difficulties more broadly with pharmaco-eco-
nomic evaluation in developing countries, citing a lack of capacity due 
to a shortage of qualified researchers and health care data. Fragmented 
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health systems generate poor data on health needs. However, African 
and other low- and middle-income public procurement bodies face the 
challenge of procuring innovator medicines as well as generics, and 
need to develop assessment skills for price negotiations. More generally, 
a procurement process that seeks to identify population health needs 
and then encourage local supply development has to build up tools over 
time to assess the benefits of local innovations. 
 Conclusion: procurement as development policy 
and process 
 Public procurement is an important development tool, and in medicines 
it needs to be designed to interlock industrial innovation and develop-
ment with the huge scale of African unmet health need. Given the scale 
of medicines procurement, and its life-or-death importance, its institu-
tional design and operation therefore require much more policy and 
research attention. Medicines procurement is at the same time highly 
technical – requiring capabilities identified in this chapter in financing 
and health benefit assessment – and also highly political. It involves sets 
of rules, but it is also a complex set of social and institutional relation-
ships. When it goes wrong, both health and industry suffers. 
 We have suggested two innovative aspects of procurement that will 
occupy much more attention of African policy makers. The first is the 
procurement payment systems and the ways in which they can be 
designed to act as assets and incentives for local industrial development. 
The other is the assessment processes that can underpin pricing systems 
that go beyond competitive tendering to generate negotiated prices for 
innovative suppliers. Finally, we have argued that value-based pricing is 
just one example of potential innovative procurement mechanisms that 
can be designed to have at their heart the objective of both incentivizing 
industrial suppliers and directing their efforts to address unmet health 
need. Public procurement may be underfunded by national budgets, but 
collaboration with donors and private firms can, if purposively designed, 
promote local production, innovation and access to medicines. 
 Notes 
 The authors would like to thank Sonja Marjanovic from RAND Europe for helpful 
conversations about this chapter. 
1. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria,  http://www.theglo-
balfund.org/en/ (accessed 25 April 2015). 
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 2 .  The NHS spends about £11 billion annually on drugs of which £8 billion is 
on branded drugs. This represents about 13% and 10% of available resources, 
respectively (Claxton et al., 2008). 
 3 .  Figure 6 in this report has some case vignettes of VBP agreements. 
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